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ABSTRACT 
 
This article interrogates the constitutional relevance of African social 
ordering rules in petroleum governance in Sub-Saharan African petroleum 
producing states. At the apex of the hierarchized African legal system is 
the national constitution which contains the basic norm or grundnorm 
derived from Western received law. Yet some African scholars have 
described African social ordering norms as grundnorms. This goes 
contrary to the conventional positivist position that “a legal system cannot 
be founded on two conflicting grundnorms.”1 This article will consider 
whether African social ordering norms have attained the level of a 
grundnorm as expounded in Kelsen’s pure theory. Utilising the Ekeh’s 
“two publics” model, it investigates how the basic norm for African social 
ordering grundnorms is presupposed. 
The article considers whether there is a conflict between the domanial 
system of state ownership as approved by African national constitutions 
and indigenous African social ordering norms premised on 
communitarianism. The article presents for analysis the recent study 
undertaken by African Petroleum Producers Association (APPA). This 
study considers whether it is possible to standardise the rules of petroleum 
contractual governance in Africa. This has led to some discussion on 
whether the standardisation of these rules could lead to the development 
of an African Lex Petrolea. This article explores the role that African 
social ordering norms can play in the development of a continent-wide 
Lex Petrolea. 
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
The grundnorm is described as the fundamental or “foundation” rule 
that underpins a legal system.2 In many post-colonial African states, the 
grundnorm is presented in the national constitution, the supreme law of an 
African hierarchical legal system.3 The typical hierarchical African legal 
system is pluralist in nature. It consists of Western received law which 
operate side by side with non-Western norms and rules. These non-
Western norms and rules are described by Chigara4 as African social 
ordering grundnorms.  
The status of these indigenous social ordering “grundnorms” in the 
hierarchized legal systems of post-colonial African states is in debate. 
Limited evidence5 is provided on how these rules have attained the 
presupposed status of a grundnorm as required in Kelsen’s pure theory. In 
contrast, it is presupposed that the national constitution of an African 
democratic state embodies the grundnorm or foundation rule. 6 A conflict 
of norms will arise if it is agreed that African social ordering norms have 
attained the status of a grundnorm. This contradicts the positivist approach 
which holds that “a system founded on the Grundnorm cannot allow for 
two equally valid norms to contradict each other as this would threaten the 
unity of the system.”7 
                                                     
2 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Translation from the Second German Edition 
by Max Knight, University of California Press, 1967. x) Reprinted 2005 by the 
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd; Trevor Hartley, “National Law, International Law and 
EU Law- How do they Relate?” in Patrick Capps, Malcolm Evans, (eds) 
Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal Perspectives (Hart 
Publishing, 2003) 67. 
3 Richard Oppong, Legal Aspects of Economic Integration in Africa (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011) 208. 
4 Ben Chigara, “The Humwe Principle: A Social-Ordering Grundnorm for 
Zimbabwe and Africa” in Robert Home (ed) Essays in African Land Law 
(Pretoria University Law Press, 2011) 113. The reference to African “social 
ordering grundnorms” is based on Chigara's work. 
5 Ibid. See 113, 120 where he describes Humwe as a new social ordering 
grundnorm. 
6 Oppong (n 3) 208. 
7 Panos Merkouris, Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the Principle of Systemic 
Integration (BRILL, 2015) 167. 
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Following Kelsen’s theory of pure law, the validity of the basic norm 
is premised on a presupposition exercise.8 This exercise is linked to the 
concept of efficacy where the grundnorm is presupposed as the highest 
law because it is followed and obeyed. This leads to the question on why 
people follow and obey the basic law and treat it as the highest norm? The 
positivist school will point to sovereign power or to the will of the 
people.9 The national constitution is established by the will of the people 
as the supreme law of the land.10  
There are drawbacks to this position. This is because of the existence 
of “two publics” in post-colonial African states. Ekeh presents a seminal 
discourse11 on these two key publics. These two publics are the “civic 
public” and the “primordial public.”12 The civic public consists of the 
Westphalian state and its structures while the primordial public consists of 
families, communities and ethnic groupings. It is claimed that Africans 
pay more allegiance to the ‘primordial public’ than to the “civic public.”13 
While there has been some criticism14 on Ekeh’s “two publics” theory, it 
does provide some context on why some local communities within an 
African sovereign state find it difficult to accept the national constitution 
as the foundational norm on community matters. Utilising Ekeh’s two 
publics theory, this article will explore whether recurring resource 
conflicts in some African oil producing states is due to the insistence of 
the amoral African state that its national constitution should be regarded 
as the fundamental norm for petroleum governance. It considers whether 
oil resource conflicts can be resolved by affording greater legitimacy to 
indigenous social ordering norms that local communities can identify 
with.  
To address these issues, the article is organised in the following 
manner. Part one of this article provides the introductory context. Part two 
focuses on the legal governance of petroleum resources in Sub- Saharan 
African states. Part three of the article considers the construction and 
                                                     
8 Uta Bindreiter, Why Grundnorm?: A Treatise on the Implications of Kelsen's 
Doctrine (Kluwer International, 2002) 19. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Donald Dahlin, We the People: A Brief Introduction to the Constitution and its 
Interpretation (Springer, 2012) Chapter Three. 
11 Peter Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical 
Statement” (1975) 17(1) Comparative Studies in Society and History 91-112. 
12 Ibid, 92. 
13 Ibid, 107-108. 
14 Brown Onouha, “Publishing Postcolonial Africa: Nigeria and Ekeh's Two 
Publics a Generation After” (2014) 40(2) Social Dynamics: A Journal of African 
Studies 322-337. 
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development of the African social ordering grundnorm. Part four 
considers the merits and demerits of developing an African Lex Petrolea 
based on indigenous social ordering norms. Part five provides the 
concluding remarks of the article.  
 
PART TWO: LEGAL GOVERNANCE OF PETROLEUM 
RESOURCES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
Petroleum Ownership Structures 
 
Legal governance of petroleum resources in Sub-Saharan Africa has 
its roots in the continent’s colonial legacy. The constitutions of most 
petroleum producing African states vests ownership of petroleum 
resources in situ with the state based on the domanial system of 
ownership. Petroleum ownership structures are generally based on 
regalian and domanial systems. The Roman based regalian system entitles 
the sovereign to exercise dominium directum (dominion over the soil) and 
to assume ownership over minerals extracted from the soil. The regalian 
system also recognises a separate subsidiary right known as dominium 
utile (the right to profit and use of soil).15 Hepburn16 claims that the 
regalian system of dominium directum is integrated into the domanial 
system. Under this system, ownership of petroleum resources in the soil 
and within the sub-soil is vested with the sovereign state. An examination 
of the legal systems of post-colonial African states establishes that many 
of these states operate the domanial system of petroleum ownership. In the 
domanial system of ownership structure, petroleum resources in situ is 
exclusively vested in the State. The following table provides a case study 
of the Sub-Saharan African member countries of the African Petroleum 
Producers Association (APPA). This table illustrates that most APPA 
countries practice the domanial legal systems of ownership within their 
constitutional and state law framework.17 The North African APPA 
countries have been excluded from this table on the premise that the focus 
of this article is legal governance in Sub-Saharan African oil producing 
countries. 
 
 
                                                     
15Samantha Hepburn, Mining and Energy Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2015) 11. 
16 Ibid. 
17 The APPA is an Inter-Governmental and Collaborative Association of African 
Petroleum Producing States (AAPA). See www.aapa.int/en/pres/. 
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Legal Ownership of Petroleum Resources in APPA Sub-Saharan 
African Countries 
 
African Oil 
Producing 
States 
Region Legal Framework on 
Ownership 
Ownership  
Structure 
Constitutional and 
Statutory 
Provisions 
Angola Southern Africa Constitution of Angola 2010. Domanial The preamble of the 
2010 Constitution 
vests ownership with 
the State. 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
West Africa Decree Law No. 8/2006 of 
November 2006 
(Hydrocarbons Law) and 
Petroleum Regulation of the 
Republic of Equatorial 
Guinea Num. 4/2013 
(Petroleum Regulation). 
Domanial The Hydrocarbons 
Law and Petroleum 
Regulation vests 
ownership with the 
State. 
Ghana  West Africa Constitution of the Fourth 
Republic of Ghana 
(Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act 
527). 
Domanial Article 257(6) of the 
1996 Constitution 
states that minerals 
in their natural state 
are the property of 
the state.  
Nigeria  West Africa  Constitution of Nigeria 1999 
and the Nigerian Petroleum 
Act 1969. 
Domanial S.44 (3) of the  
Constitution and the 
Nigerian Petroleum 
Act 1969 vests oil 
and gas resources in 
the Federal 
Government of 
Nigeria. 
Benin West Africa Petroleum Code of 2006 -
18. 
Domanial Article 3 of the Code 
separates the 
deposits of liquid and 
gaseous 
hydrocarbons from 
the ownership of 
land. It regards these 
deposits as public 
property that belongs 
to the nation.  
Cameroon West Africa Constitution of the Republic 
of Cameroon 1996 as 
amended by Law No 
2008/001 and  
Law No. 99/013 of 22 
December 1999,  
instituting the Petroleum 
Code (the  
Petroleum Code). 
Domanial Article 21 of the 
Constitution 
endorses charter 
rights that vests all 
peoples with rights to 
freely dispose of their 
wealth and 
resources. The 
Constitution is silent 
on who owns 
petroleum resources.  
 
Article 3 of the 
Petroleum Code 
1999 provides for 
state ownership of all 
deposits or natural 
accumulations of 
hydrocarbons and 
treats these deposits 
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African Oil 
Producing 
States 
Region Legal Framework on 
Ownership 
Ownership  
Structure 
Constitutional and 
Statutory 
Provisions 
as the exclusive 
property of the 
Cameroonian state.  
Chad West Africa Constitution of Chad 1996 
with amendments through 
2005. 
 
Law no. 006/PR/2007 dated 
20 April  
2007 on hydrocarbons, as 
amended and  
supplemented by Ordinance 
no. 001/ 
PR/2010 dated September 
30, 2010 and Decree no. 
796/PR/PM/MPE/2010 
dated  
September 30, 2010 
implementing the  
Hydrocarbons Law.  
Domanial Article 57 of the 
Constitution vests the 
State with permanent 
sovereignty over all 
the national natural 
resources for the 
well- being of the 
national community.  
 
Article 2.1 of the 
Hydrocarbon Laws 
vests hydrocarbons 
in their natural state 
to the Republic of 
Chad. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Central Africa Constitution of Congo the 
Democratic Republic of the 
2005 with amendments up 
to 2011. 
 
The Petroleum Law (Law 
No. 15/012 dated 1 August 
2015). 
Domanial Article 9 of the 
Constitution requires 
that the State should 
have permanent 
sovereignty over 
natural resources. 
Republic of 
Congo (RoC) 
Central Africa  Constitution of Republic of 
Congo 2001. 
 
Law no 24-94 dated 23 
August 1994 (Petroleum 
Code), Decree no 2008-15 
dated 11 February 2008 
(Attribution Code). 
Domanial The Constitution is 
silent on ownership. 
The state codes vest 
ownership of 
hydrocarbons in the 
Congolese soil and 
sub-soil. 
Côte d'Ivoire West Africa  Constitution of Côte d'Ivoire 
2000. 
 
The Petroleum Code of Côte 
d'Ivoire, instituted by Law N° 
96-669 of August 29, 1996.  
 
Ordinance N° 2012-369 of 
April 18, 2012, amending 
Law N° 96-669 of August 29, 
1996 establishing the 
Petroleum Code.  
 
Decree N° 96-733 of 
September 19, 1996, laying 
down general rules for the 
application of the law on the 
Petroleum Code. 
Domanial The Constitution is 
silent on ownership 
of petroleum 
resources. 
 
Mineral rights in 
natural hydrocarbons 
deposits and 
accumulations are 
vested in the state by 
the Petroleum Code.   
Gabon Central Africa  Constitution of Gabon 1991 
with amendments through 
1997. 
 
 
Hydrocarbons Law (Law No. 
Domanial The Gabon 
Constitution does not 
expressly discuss 
ownership of 
petroleum resources. 
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African Oil 
Producing 
States 
Region Legal Framework on 
Ownership 
Ownership  
Structure 
Constitutional and 
Statutory 
Provisions 
11/2014 of August 28 2014).  The Hydrocarbons 
Law vests ownership 
of petroleum 
resources with the 
state. 
South Africa  Southern Africa  Constitution of the Republic 
of South African1996. 
 
 Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 
28 of 2002 (“MPRDA). 
Domanial Section 24 of the 
Constitution requires 
that natural 
resources should be 
developed in an 
ecologically 
sustainable manner. 
The MPRDA vests 
ownership of mineral 
and petroleum 
resources in the 
nation of South Africa 
and the Minister of 
Natural Resources. 
Mauritania West Africa  Constitution of Mauritania 
1991 with amendments 
through 2012. 
 
Act No. 2008-011 on the 
Mining Code (27 April 2008). 
 
Ordinance No. 2002-005 
regulating the activities of 
the downstream oil sector 
(28 March 2002). 
Domanial The Mauritanian 
Constitution does not 
expressly set out 
provisions on 
ownership of natural 
resources.  
 
The Mining Code 
states that deposits 
are separate from 
land ownership. It 
vest ownership of 
these deposits in the 
state.  
Niger West Africa  Constitution of Niger 2010. 
 
Petroleum Code Act No 
2007- 01. 
Domanial Article 149 of the 
Constitution provides 
state sovereignty 
over natural 
resources and the 
sub-soil.  
Source: Author's research 
 
The table above demonstrates that the domanial system of state 
ownership derives its legitimacy from the constitutional framework and 
national legislation of a petroleum producing state.18 Under this 
framework, the African state is the owner of petroleum resources in situ 
and it collaborates with multinational companies (MNCs) to exploit its 
resources. The collaborative effort between the state and the MNC is 
necessary. This is because most African states lack the necessary risk 
capital and required technical know-how to exploit their oil and gas 
resources. Under the domanial system, the state will grant MNCs the right 
to exploit petroleum resources through a host state agreement (HSA). 
                                                     
18 Hepburn (n 15) 11-12. 
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There are different models of the HSAs, but the most commonly utilised 
in the African continent are the Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) 
and modern Oil Concessions (OCs).19 PSAs and Service Contracts (SCs) 
are well suited for domanial systems of petroleum governance. This is 
because the MNC acts as the contractor for the State. Unlike the OC 
where the MNC can claim ownership of produced oil at the wellhead, the 
MNC has no legal title to produced oil under the PSA and SC. The PSA 
does however permit the MNC to participate with a State Owned 
Company (SOC) or National Oil Company (NOC) in a stream of oil 
revenue known as profit oil.  
The state constitution and petroleum legislation regulate these 
contracts alongside with rules of international investment law. This 
confirms the pluralist nature of petroleum governance in African oil 
producing states. It is instructive that within this pluralist system, there 
appears to be no place for African social ordering rules. The exclusion of 
indigenous rules from the pluralist petroleum legal system is a matter  of 
concern considering that petroleum resources is undertaken in indigenous 
oil producing communities. Ekeh’s “two publics” theory shows that these 
communities adhere more to the dictates of the customary rules developed 
by the “primordial public,” than to state law which is developed by the 
“civic public”.20 Yet HSA contracts are executed between amoral civic 
state and MNCs without the direct involvement of local communities.21  
The bilateral nature of these contracts is premised on state sovereignty 
over petroleum resources. Equally, MNCs provide the necessary risk 
capital to secure the contractual bargain of these contracts. In contrast, the 
local oil producing communities which bear the brunt of oil and gas 
exploitation are not contractual parties to the HSAs. In a domanial system, 
the control and management of natural resources is constitutionally vested 
in the national state. Accordingly, local communities are not considered as 
having the necessary constitutional standing to participate in HSAs. This 
is an unsatisfactory state of affairs and is a contributory factor for the 
resource conflicts that take place within these communities.22  
                                                     
19 Emmanuel Laryea, “Contractual Arrangements for Resource Investment” in. 
Francis Botchway (ed) Natural Resource Investment and African Development 
(Edward Elgar, 2011) 108-116. 
20 Ekeh (n 11) 198. 
21 Hephzibah Egede and Edwin Egede, “The Force of the Community in the 
Niger Delta of Nigeria: Propositions for New Oil and Gas Legal and Contractual 
Arrangements” (2016) 25 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 
1-37 (forthcoming). This article is a follow-up to this work. 
22 Abiodun Alao, Natural Resources and Conflicts in Africa: The Tragedy of 
Endowment (University of Rochester Press, 2007) 170-198. 
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Oil Producing Communities and the Right to Self-Determination  
 
In contrast, under International Law, local communities can exercise 
qualified sovereignty and self-determination over their natural resources. 
These rights are set out in international instruments such as the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources23 which embodies the right of sovereign states and 
their peoples to exercise sovereignty over their resources.24 The 2007 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides 
indigenous peoples with the rights to self-determination and participation 
in the decision-making process over their natural resources. The 2007 
Declaration does not vest indigenous peoples: 
 
“expressis verbis with permanent sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources or entails exclusive rights for indigenous 
peoples over the natural resources within their territories”.25  
 
It does however provide these communities with participatory or 
consultative rights in the decision-making process over the management 
and control over natural resources. Article 32 of the 2007 Declaration 
requires states to undertake bona-fide consultations and cooperation 
initiatives with their indigenous communities before undertaking or 
engaging with projects that may impact on their lands and resources. 
Article 46(1) stipulates that the conferment of the right to self-
determination under this Declaration should not be construed as: 
 
“authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States”. 
 
This confirms that the right to self-determination as provided in 
Article 4 is confined to the participatory rights set out in Articles 25-28 of 
the Declaration. It does not entitle communities to secede or assert 
political independence outside the sovereign states in which they are 
                                                     
23 UNGA Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. 
24 Ibid para 1. 
25 Nicolaas Schrijver, “Self-determination of Peoples and Sovereignty over 
Natural Wealth and Resources” in Realising the Right of Development: Essays in 
Commemoration of 25 Years of the United Nations Declaration on the Right to 
Development (United Nations, 2013) 99. 
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situated. Article 21(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights26 also confirms the right of African peoples to: 
 
“... freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right 
shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no 
case shall a people be deprived of it”. 
 
The right of African peoples to exercise self determination over their 
wealth and resources has been deliberated upon by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. In the decided cases of 
Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for 
Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria27 and Endorois v. Kenya,28 
the Commission affirmed the obligation of states to respect and protect the 
rights granted to African peoples under the Charter.  
In the Endorois case, the Commission specifically affirmed that 
Kenya should have obtained the Endorois community’s ‘free, prior, and 
informed consent, according to their customs and traditions’29 before 
undertaking development projects within their territory. This decision 
highlights the role that African “social ordering” rules can play in natural 
resource governance. It further underscores Ekeh’s claims that many 
Africans simultaneously live and function within the “primordial” and 
“civic publics”. This is why it is important to consider the relevance of 
African ‘social ordering rules’ in petroleum governance. 
 
PART THREE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SOCIAL 
ORDERING GRUNDNORM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
The Mixed African Legal System of Governance in Norm Formulation 
 
The use of received Western law in the legal systems of many African 
states is a legacy of colonialism. Menski30 explains that received rules are 
derived from the legal systems of other countries. He argues that the 
involuntary imposition of these rules has created a cultural conflict 
between Western received law and the indigenous rules of post-colonial 
states.31 As previously stated, many African states have adopted the 
                                                     
26Adopted in Nairobi June 27 1981. Entered into force October 21 1986. 
27 Communication No. 155/96, 2001. 
28 Communication No. 276/2003. 
29Ibid, para 291 (emphasis added). 
30 Menski (n 1) 126. 
31 Ibid. 
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system known as legal pluralism to resolve the conflict between Western 
received Law and indigenous rules. The seminal work of Griffiths32 
establishes that there are weak and strong constructions of the concept of 
legal pluralism. The weak construction of legal pluralism is a system 
where the state sanctions or permits the operation of multiple legal 
systems within its jurisdictional sphere. The difficulty with the weak 
construction of legal pluralism is that the civic state has the final say on 
the rules that can apply in its legal system. Griffiths views the weak 
construction of legal pluralism as a form of legal centralism. This is 
because it is reliant on the concept of a hierarchy of rules where state law 
has pre-eminence. Conversely, the strong construction of legal pluralism 
discredits the purist positivist construction of law which focuses on a 
“single, unified and exclusive hierarchical normative ordering depending 
from the power of the state”.33 Griffith argues that the strong construction 
of legal pluralism envisions a system where multiple bodies of rules can 
operate within a decentralised system. 
It is debatable if African states actually practise the strong 
construction of legal pluralism. It appears that the mixed African legal 
systems of most African states is premised on a hierarchy of rules where 
the state constitution is situated at the apex of the system. This 
hierarchised system prioritises Western received law above customary law 
and creates the cultural conflict described in Menski’s work.34 Arguably, 
the modernisation theory has played a role in the prioritisation of Western 
received law above African customary law. This is because it requires that 
Africa follow in the “developmental footsteps of Europe (largely the 
former colonizer of Africa)”.35 Notwithstanding the role that the 
modernisation theory has played in the development of the African civic 
public and in its formation of legal rules, the Endorois decision 
underscores the continuing importance of African customary law. Within 
this customary framework, Chigara36 argues that there are fundamental 
social ordering rules or norms which can be regarded as African 
grundnorms. This is because the primordial public pre-supposes them to 
be so. He further claims that these ‘ancient social ordering’ rules predate 
colonialism and were presupposed by Africans as the foundational rules 
                                                     
32 John Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 5. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Menski (n 1) 126. 
35 Jephias Matunhu, “A Critique of Modernisation and Dependency Theories in 
Africa: Critical Assessment” (2011) 3(5) Journal of History and Culture 65. 
36 Chigara (n 4) 113. 
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that governed pre-colonial African communities. He however does not 
provide definitive evidence on how these specific norms attained the 
revered status of “grundnorm” except to point to their historical relevance 
and applicability continent-wide. 
Chigara presents Humwe (a Shona concept) as an example of an 
indigenous social ordering grundnorm. The term is defined as “in this 
together” or “us all”. It can be described as African communitarianism, 
interdependence and humanness. He further argues that there are similar 
African norms and points to the popular Zulu concept ‘Umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu’ (abridged as Ubuntu- People are people through people) and to 
Umoja, a Swahili term for communal unity. His research also identifies 
similar norms in other parts of Africa, including West Africa.37 Ramose38 
in his leading African philosophical text, argues that indigenous norms 
such as Ubuntu are important because they stem from “the wellspring 
flowing from African ontology and epistemology”.39 He further argues 
that they apply continent wide because of the “philosophical affinity and 
kinship between the indigenous people of Africa”.40 It is however unclear 
if this “affinity and kinship” of African peoples is the determining 
consideration for the claim that these rules have attained the status of 
grundnorms.  
There is another school of thought that rejects the continent wide 
application of norms like Ubuntu or Humwe. Vans Binsbergen for 
example expresses some scepticism on the continent-wide application of 
concepts like Ubuntu. He argues that there is insufficient evidence to 
substantiate this claim.41 Similarly, Simiyu42 argues that African 
communitarianism is a Utopian ideal in light of the historical realities of 
many post-colonial countries that make up the sub-continent. This 
position may hold true if concepts like Ubuntu are simply confined to the 
                                                     
37 Ibid, 117-18. 
38 Mogobe Ramose, African Philosophy through Ubuntu (Mond Books, 1999) 49. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Wim Van Binsbergen, Intercultural Encounters: African and Anthropological 
Lessons Towards a Philosophy of Interculturality (Munster: Lit Verlag 2003) 
Chapter 14.  
42 Vincent Simiyu, “The Democratic Myth in the African Traditional Societies” in 
Walter Oyugi and Afrifra Gitonga (eds), Democratic Theory and Practice in 
Africa (East African Educational Publishers, 1987) 49-51. 
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notion of African communitarianism. This is not the case since these 
terms also connote “personhood” and “humanness”.43 
 
State Recognition of African Social Ordering Grundnorms 
 
Notwithstanding the ongoing debate on the continent-wide use of 
indigenous social ordering norms, some African states have attempted to 
incorporate these rules within their constitutional framework. South 
Africa is a pertinent example of an APPA state that regards Ubuntu as a 
fundamental social ordering norm. Constitutional recognition of this rule 
was provided within the transitional Constitution of South Africa 1993. It 
is instructive that the final 1996 Constitution did not follow suit.44 But the 
importance of this norm in the South African legal framework has been 
recognised by the South African courts. In the landmark South African 
constitutional court case of S v. Makwanyane,45 the South African 
Constitutional Court approved the constitutional importance of the 
indigenous Ubuntu norm. This case considered section 277 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977 which provided for the use of the 
death penalty. The court denounced the use of death penalty in the South 
African criminal law system. In framing its decision, the Court invoked 
the ontological concept of Ubuntu with its emphasis on the value of 
human life and dignity. It held that the death penalty could be 
characterised as “inhumane punishment” since it deprived the convicted 
person of human dignity. The Court further held that the continuing use of 
the death penalty was contrary to the constitutional focus on national unity 
and reconciliation which in a large part is premised on the norm of 
Ubuntu. The Court held: 
 
“The notion of Ubuntu expressly provided for in the epilogue of 
the Constitution, the underlying idea and its accompanying values 
are also expressed in the preamble. These values underlie, first and 
foremost, the whole idea of adopting a Bill of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms in a new legal order. They are central to the 
coherence of all the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 - where the 
                                                     
Chikosa Silungwe, “On African Legal Theory: A Possibility, An Impossibility or 
Mere Conundrum” in Oche Onazi (ed) African Legal Theory and Constitutional 
Problems: Critical Essays (Springer, 2014) 27. 
44 Chuma Himonga, Max Taylor, Ann Pope, “Reflections on Judicial Views of 
Ubuntu” (2013) 16(5) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 373. 
45 [1995] ZACC 3. 
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right to life and the right to respect for and protection of human 
dignity are embodied in Sections 9 and 10 respectively”.46 
 
There are cases47 within the South African legal framework which 
provide similar recognition of the use of Ubuntu in the South African 
legal system. It is unclear if there is similar state practice in other African 
states. This does not mean that customary rules do not play a role within 
the legal systems of these states. They however may not have the same 
relevance as Western received law especially with regard to commercial 
matters. 
The article turns to the state practice of Nigeria, another APPA state 
example. Nigeria is a major oil producing state in the African sub-
continent. Unlike the South African experience, the Nigerian legal system 
has not singled out a specific indigenous rule or norm that could serve as a 
guiding rule in the development of law. In allowing for the establishment 
of Customary and Sharia Courts of Appeal, the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution48 does recognise the role that customary law and Islamic law 
play in the Nigerian mixed legal system.  
Comparative perspectives can be provided on why it may pose a 
challenge for Nigeria to single out one particular indigenous social norm 
to guide its legal system. First the Nigerian cultural milieu is different 
from South Africa. Unlike South Africa, Nigeria communal life is not 
only governed by indigenous African rules but also by Shariah law. 
Second, Nigerian is much more ethnically diverse than South Africa and 
its customary law practices are not unified. The localisation of Nigerian 
customary law is confirmed in Section 258(1) of the Nigerian Evidence 
Act 2011.49 This section states that “a rule which in a particular district, 
has from long usage, obtained the force of law”. By confining the rule to a 
particular district, the Nigerian Evidence Act recognises how ethnically 
diverse the Nigerian state is. It will therefore be difficult to single out a 
particular customary rule of law as a basic grundnorm, except where 
evidence can be shown that it transcends all districts in Nigeria. To 
establish this, native chiefs or other person who are recognised as having 
special knowledge of customary law will have to provide evidence that 
                                                     
46 Ibid, para 307. 
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validates the custom.50 Some have pointed to certain customary law rules 
in Nigeria that have “near universality of application”.51 One such 
customary rule can be found in customary intestate succession where it is 
argued that widows have very limited capacity to inherit capacity.  
The localisation of customary law in Nigerian law may explain why it 
has limited or no application in the regulation of the Nigerian oil and gas 
sector. This creates a conundrum in light of Ekeh’s “Two Publics” theory. 
If as Ekeh argues that the “primordial public” is more legitimised than the 
“civic public” the Nigerian legal framework may need to lend itself to the 
application of indigenous social grundnorms in the governance and 
regulation the Oil and Gas sector. This is necessary as oil producing 
communities bear the brunt of oil and gas exploitation that is undertaken 
in their territories. A key African “social ordering” rule that is relevant to 
petroleum governance is communal ownership of land (and its resources). 
 
African Ownership of Land and its Resources: Public or Communal 
Ownership  
 
Ubuntu, Humwe and similar social ordering rules focus on inter-
dependence, communality, fairness and humanness. These rules recognise 
the concept of communal ownership in land.52 Following colonialization 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, attempts were made to replace the communal land 
ownership with the native land tenure system. This system disallowed 
Africans from purchasing property outside so called native land. In the 
Southern African region, the native land tenure system was strictly 
enforced during the apartheid era and led to the dispossession of 
indigenous property rights in land.53 The native land tenure system 
resulted in the subjugation of customary rights in land and led to the 
introduction of the domanial system where rights in land were transferred 
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to the colonial state.54 The native land tenure system in a warped way 
preserved communal land, but at the same time denied indigenous 
communities the right to manage and control their lands and resources. 
This was done through the concept of trusteeship where the colonial state 
held customary land in trust for the indigenous population.55 
Independent African states have repealed native land tenure 
legislation, but some African states, including Nigeria have maintained 
the trusteeship concept of land. In Nigeria, during the tenure of military 
governance, radical changes were made to the land tenure system through 
the enactment of the Land Use Act (LUA) 1978.56 The LUA vests all land 
in the states of the Federation of Nigeria to their respective state 
governors. These governors hold land in trust for the use and benefit of all 
Nigerians.  
Unlike the native land tenure system, the LUA confers certain property 
rights to individual, families and communities. The rights are described as 
a statutory right of occupancy and the customary rights of occupancy 
respectively.57 The effect of the LUA is to extinguish the pre-existing 
rights in land and replace them with limited rights similar to a leasehold.58 
The trusteeship system of land set out in section 1 raises interesting issues. 
This is because “at the core of a trust concept is a duty of confidence 
imposed upon a trustee.”59 Further, as stated by Lord Evershed MR, “for a 
trust to be effective, it must have ascertained or ascertainable 
beneficiaries.”60 
Section 1 of the LUA identifies the ascertained beneficiaries of its 
statutory trusteeship system. These beneficiaries are “all Nigerian 
citizens.” The focus on citizenship (which is one of the key features of the 
Westphalian state system) and not on ethnic groups or indigenous peoples 
is connected with the public interest concern of fostering social cohesion 
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and national development.61 But as Ekeh’s “Two Publics” model 
demonstrates, the “primordial public” is viewed by some Africans as more 
important than the “civic public.”62 The extinction of pre-existing rights, 
and the replacement of such rights, with the limited rights’ regime set out 
in the Act is seen as an attempt to prioritise the interests of the “civic 
public” above those of the “primordial public”. This creates a confidence 
gap which goes against the core of the trust concept which is predicated 
on the “confidence imposed upon a trustee”.63 
This has led to the call, in certain quarters, for the repeal or 
fundamental restructuring of the LUA.64 It will be a difficult task to repeal 
or change this law due to its constitutional importance. Section 315 (5) of 
the 1999 Constitution confers the Act with the same status as the 
provisions of the Constitution. It states that the Act cannot “be altered or 
repealed except in accordance with the provisions of section 9 (2) of this 
Constitution”.65 This means that the LUA cannot be repealed or altered 
except the proposal for repeal or amendment is supported by no less than 
a two-third majority of the National Assembly, and by no less than two-
thirds of all the states of Nigeria. Notwithstanding the substantive changes 
that have been made to the Nigerian land tenure system by state law, local 
communities still perceive indigenous land tenure to be communal in 
nature. 
The reforms to communal ownership is not only confined to the land 
tenure, it also applies to ownership of mineral resources. The Nigerian 
1999 Constitution as the supreme national law confers ownership of the 
‘entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas 
in under or upon land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters 
and the Exclusive Economic Zone’66 to the Government of the Federation 
of Nigeria. Public ownership of petroleum resources is also re-affirmed in 
the Petroleum Act 1969 where the ‘entire ownership and control of all 
petroleum in, under or upon any lands to which this section applies shall 
be vested in the State.’67 
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The Constitution and the state legislation cited above establishes that 
natural resources, inclusive of petroleum is owned by the Nigerian state 
and not by oil producing communities. This explains why social ordering 
indigenous rules play no apparent role in the regulation and management 
of the Nigerian oil and gas sector. Yet, the exploitation of these resources 
are undertaken in the communities that still subscribe to communal 
ownership of all resources.  
 
Recurring Resource Conflicts: The Tale of Two Publics 
 
This article has explained how ownership of communal land and 
natural resources has evolved from strict communal ownership to public 
ownership in some African countries. The land tenure system in Nigeria, 
an APPA state has been presented as a case study of the growing role of 
public ownership of land. The concluding section of this part considers 
whether the prioritisation of public ownership over communal ownership 
creates a conflict between the two publics discussed in Ekeh’s work. 
Oshio, in an early piece,68 on the LUA argues that section 1 of the Act has 
adopted some features of the indigenous system of communal ownership. 
He asserts that state governors hold a role similar to the community or 
family head. This is because they hold land in trust for the people they 
govern. He further points out that while there may be some basis for this 
comparison between public ownership and communal ownership, the LUA 
has created areas of conflict between these two systems of land tenure 
governance. These areas of conflict arise in the management and control 
of the land, particularly with regard, to the allocation to members of the 
community and the partition of the sale of land.  
Another key area of conflict which Oshio’s article did not consider is 
the legitimisation process of the reforms initiated by the LUA. As 
previously stated, the LUA is a legacy of military governance which 
continues to enjoy constitutional protection under the Nigerian 1999 
Constitution. Applying Ekeh’s “Two Publics’ model”,69 it could be argued 
that the continuing legitimisation of the LUA by the 1999 Constitution has 
been undertaken within the “civic public” and its institutions. It is 
therefore questionable whether the LUA has received the same 
legitimisation process within the “primordial public” where oil and gas 
exploitation takes place. The same concern applies to public ownership of 
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the petroleum resources where oil producing communities continue to 
clamour for resource control.  
This issue is important as it provides some explanation on why there 
are recurring resource conflicts in regions like the Niger Delta. This is 
because as Ekeh asserts the primordial public which consists of family, 
clan and community is more legitimised by ordinary Africans than the 
civic public which is premised on colonial structures and received law. 
Yet, as the studies70 on Nigeria’s constitutional history show, the framing 
and development of the different Nigerian Constitutions and other state 
laws has been undertaken by institutions within the “civic public” with 
little or no direct involvement by the “primordial public” in the decision 
making process. This may explain, why there is a sense of alienation 
within oil producing communities regarding the transfer of ownership of 
natural resources from communal ownership to public (state) ownership. 
It brings to light the “cultural conflict” highlighted in Menski’s work71 
between received law and indigenous law. Yet the reality of the post-
colonial African experience is that both sets of rules operate within most 
African pluralist systems. The real conflict stems from a hierarchized 
legal system which prioritises one set of rules above another instead of 
allowing for a co-existence of rules. 
This is why the interim 1993 Constitution of South Africa has been 
held up as a good example of how an indigenous social ordering can be 
effectively incorporated into the supreme law of the land. Sadly, the 1996 
final South African Constitution did not follow suit and failed to expressly 
enshrine Ubuntu in its text. There are concerns on why the 1996 
Constitution expressly failed to include Ubuntu within its framework. 
Mokgoro, a leading jurist and proponent of Ubuntu however argues that 
the fundamental values of the current South African Constitution coincide 
with “some of the key values of Ubuntu(ism) e.g. human dignity itself, 
respect, inclusivity, compassion, concern for others, honesty and 
conformity.”72 While this position may hold true to some extent, the non-
inclusion of Ubuntu in the 1996 Constitution is a missed opportunity for 
the constitutional legitimisation of indigenous normative development. It 
also means that the development of natural resources may not need to be 
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based on indigenous normative obligations. Indeed all that the final 1996 
Constitution requires is that natural resources should be developed in an 
ecologically sustainable manner. While this is a positive step, the control 
and management of mineral and petroleum resources still rests with the 
State as custodian.73  
This again confirms the domanial nature of petroleum ownership and 
the continuing role that the international rule of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources74 plays in petroleum governance in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Yet, the considered position is that the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources does not only apply only to states but 
to their peoples.75 It is therefore questionable why many African oil 
producing states in their municipal systems have adopted the narrow 
construction of this principle which confines sovereignty over natural 
resources to domanial state ownership. 
This appears to be an unsatisfactory state of affairs considering that 
some African states have failed to manage natural resources for national 
development and for “the well-being of the people of the State 
concerned.”76 How the “people of the State” are to be defined is quite 
crucial to a further understanding of the continuing tension between the 
primordial and civic publics. The failure of African governments to 
equitably manage resources for the well-being of their peoples has created 
the growing sense of the de-legitimisation of the “civic public” within 
local communities. This is why some in the Niger Delta oil producing 
region have argued that the Nigerian state is an artificial creation which 
lacks true affinity with “nations” that exist within the Nigerian nation 
state.77 The argument that Nigeria is a nation state of nations alludes to a 
situation where communities identify more with the “primordial public” 
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than the “civic public” as discussed in Ekeh’s work. Robinson78 describes 
this as putting ethnic identity above national identity. Further, in the 
illuminating work “Oil, Democracy and the Promise of True Federalism” 
the argument for focusing on ethnic identity above national identity is set 
out as follows: 
 
“It would be foolhardy for somebody from the Niger Delta to hope 
that a Hausa-Fulani, or Yoruba or Igbo person at the helm of 
affairs at the federal level to take the issue of the latter’s 
development as serious developmental matter. What is the portion 
in the Niger Delta? Except of course for there to be peace enough 
for oil to flow for him to use in developing himself and his true 
God created nation”.79  
 
This may explain why oil producing communities within the Niger 
Delta continue to canvass for true federalism. This will allow the 
communities to participate in the decision-making process on how oil and 
gas resources extracted from their regions are developed and utilised. 
They view the current system which vests ownership of petroleum 
resource in the Federal Nigerian State as unsatisfactory as it permits the 
development of other regions of Nigeria at the expense of the Niger Delta 
region.80 The quest for true federalism will require significant reforms of 
the municipal petroleum laws. Any proposed reforms should also be 
undertaken at the continent wide level to facilitate a greater harmonisation 
of rules. The APPA recently undertook a study on the possible 
standardisation of petroleum laws and contracts81. This has led to the 
debate on whether there is an African Lex Petrolea? The following part of 
this article further debates this point and considers the role that African 
social ordering norms can play in the development of a continent-wide 
Lex Petrolea. 
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PART FOUR: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AFRICAN LEX 
PETROLEA AND THE RELEVANCE OF INDIGENOUS SOCIAL 
ORDERING NORMS 
 
Conceptualising Lex Petrolea  
 
Lex Petrolea is defined as “transnational customary law applied by 
tribunals and courts dealing with hydrocarbon-related disputes”.82 Like 
other systems of rules, Lex Petrolea has had to go through a legitimisation 
process. When the concept was first raised in the case of Kuwait v. 
Aminoil,83 the arbitral tribunal refused to accept Kuwait’s arguments that 
there was a customary body of rules known as Lex Petrolea specifically as 
it pertains to the valuation of damages. Since this arbitral decision, 
scholarly debate has arisen on whether Lex Petrolea can be considered as 
a sub-set of international law.84 Doak Bishop in his 1998 seminal work85 
debated whether Lex Petrolea had been developed from “the 
internationalisation of business practices, usages and customs of the 
members of the international petroleum industry or community.”86 He 
found that there was inconclusive state practice and opinio juris to justify 
the maturation of a sub-set of rules in international law known as Lex 
Petrolea.87 He however opined that Lex Petrolea had begun to crystallise 
even if it was yet to “coalesce into a hard system of black letter law.”88  
Other works argue that Lex Petrolea falls within a branch of law 
known as international merchantile law or Lex Mercatoria.89 Lex 
Mercatoria is said to be derived from the “trade usage and practices of 
merchants.”90 The fact that Lex Mercatoria is developed by the practices 
of merchants implies that it is not state law neither can it be strictly 
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defined within international law. This is why some have argued that it is a 
third realm of law that exists independently outside international law and 
national law.91 Since Lex Petrolea is considered as part of Lex Mercatoria, 
it can be further argued that it is designed to serve the needs and 
aspirations of the business community.92 In this sense, the legitimacy of 
Lex Petrolea is presupposed by the international petroleum industry to 
which it caters to.93 The stakeholders within this industry consist of 
national oil companies (NOCs), large oil majors, independent companies 
and industry associations like the Association of International Petroleum 
Negotiators (AIPN). The latter body is responsible for the negotiation and 
development of internationalised oil and gas contracts which set out the 
principles and norms of Lex Petrolea.  
This however provides an incomplete picture on how Lex Petrolea is 
legitimised as a recognised field of law. Apart from its validation by the 
industry that it caters to, Childs points to the role that arbitral awards have 
played in validating the existence of Lex Petrolea.94 He argues that these 
published awards have addressed a range of issues regarding the 
exploration and production of oil and gas resources and can be considered 
as creating “a Lex Petrolea” or customary law comprising of legal rules 
adapted to the industry’s nature and specificities.95 It has be suggested that 
Lex Petrolea is further validated by petroleum development contracts.96 
Chief among these contracts are host state agreements (HSAs) or 
government contracts which are transacted between oil producing states 
and international oil companies (IOCs). While there is still some debate 
on the need to formulate a global host state model agreement, there is a 
school of thought that argues for the standardisation of terms “regardless 
of the identity of the host state”.97  
National legislation has also contributed to the development of Lex 
Petrolea. The development of the body of arbitral case law on oil and gas 
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transactions is largely due to state nationalisation or expropriation of 
foreign investment in the oil and gas sector.98 These acts of expropriation 
and nationalisation are generally premised on the principle of permanent 
sovereignty which asserts domanial state control over the exploitation of 
petroleum resources. This establishes that although Lex Petrolea is 
derived from the trade usage and practices of the international petroleum 
industry, it does not negate the role that state legislation has played in its 
development as a separate field of law. 
One significant stakeholder that has been largely ignored in the debate 
on Lex Petrolea is the local or indigenous oil community.99 Yet, as this 
article argues, the local community bears the brunt of oil and gas 
exploitation. This raises an important question on why indigenous social 
ordering rules have not played a role in the formulation and further 
development of Lex Petrolea. 
 
Framing an African Lex Petrolea  
 
A leading energy law firm, Ashurst100 has debated whether an African 
Lex Petrolea exists. This debate has arisen due to the comparative analysis 
of national legislation and host state contracts undertaken by APPA states. 
The study is designed to identify the key principles, practices and trends 
that apply to the African industry. It also seeks for the development of a 
model production sharing agreement (PSA).101 It is suggested that the 
development of these standardised rules and the model PSA could lead to 
the establishment of an African Lex Petrolea.102 It is questionable whether 
this comparative study undertaken by APPA states on the one hand and by 
“a consortium of international law firms and consultants,”103 on the other, 
will necessarily bring about the development of an African Lex Petrolea 
that will meet the needs of all stakeholders. It will appear that the APPA 
study as currently formulated is designed to cater for the needs of African 
national oil companies (NOCs) and international oil companies (IOCs). It 
does not appear that local oil communities were directly involved in its 
decision-making process. The non-inclusivity of local community needs 
may mean that an “African Lex Petrolea” solely developed from this 
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APPA study will fail to make any meaningful impact in resolving 
resource conflicts between APPA states, MNCs and local communities. 
Understanding that the oil and gas industry is prone to the risk of 
disputes, industry stakeholders have developed Lex Petrolea to assist in 
the resolution of such disputes. While these body of transnational rules 
have proved useful in the resolution of disputes between states and MNCs, 
the notion of Lex Petrolea as presently conceived is unlikely to play any 
major role in the resolution of current and emerging disputes between 
States (and MNCs) and local communities. This is because the norms that 
currently shape Lex Petrolea are primarily derived from Western received 
law and practices. 
This article argues that there is a place to embed African social 
ordering norms which focus on communitarianism, human dignity and 
social justice in oil and gas dispute resolution mechanisms. The inclusion 
of these rules in the legal system of governance of oil and gas resources 
will help to de-escalate the tensions between the “civic public” 
represented by African State structures and the “primordial public” 
represented by oil and gas producing communities.  
A close appraisal of ongoing conflicts in regions like the Niger Delta 
establish that community agitations extend beyond environmental 
degradation of their land and resources. These conflicts focus more on the 
fundamental concern that the African civic state has failed in its 
‘custodian’ role to properly utilise and administer petroleum resources 
derived from the local oil communities. These communities still value and 
hold on to the tenets of fundamental African social ordering rules such as 
Ubuntu which are based on humaneness, fairness, social justice and 
sharing. There are variants of the Ubuntu principle which exist in the 
Niger Delta region, including the Ijaw concept ‘Kemesese-ebi’ (the 
common good of all). This supports the arguments of Chigara104 and 
Ramose105 that there is an underlining African social ordering norm that 
promotes social justice, fairness and communality. The overarching 
argument of this article is that there is a role that this underlining norm 
can play in promoting a more equitable framework of petroleum 
governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
A call for the inclusion of this underlining African social ordering 
norm in Lex Petrolea and in Oil and Gas dispute resolution mechanisms 
may not be such a Utopian ideal. The recent edition of the TDM journal 
shows that there is growing call for the inclusion of African indigenous 
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rules in the arbitration of oil and gas disputes arising from Africa.106 This 
does not mean that these rules will necessarily gain the same status as the 
current Western rules that frame transnational petroleum law and national 
legislation. But the South African 1993 interim constitutional model 
demonstrates that it is possible to embed indigenous African rules within a 
civic public legal framework that focus on an African understanding of 
humaneness, social justice and communitarianism. However, the 
universalism and cultural relativism debate which resonates in the Human 
Rights Law may have an impact on the development of an African Lex 
Petrolea. This is an important point that requires further deliberation. 
 
African Lex Petrolea: Unintended Consequences of Cultural and Ethnic 
Relativism 
 
The call for the inclusion of African social ordering rules evokes the 
universalism and cultural relativism debate. This is a debate that continues 
to resonate in Human Rights law. The debate is premised on the viewpoint 
that human rights are universal and do not require cultural validation.107 
This is because human rights are premised on the inherent value of being 
human. But Donnelly108 in his leading work points out that there are 
aspects of human nature that can be considered culturally relative. He 
therefore argues that some recognition should be given to the 
‘crosscultural variations in human rights.’109 Conversely, those who argue 
against ‘cultural variability’110 have based their arguments on the fact that 
cultural relativism can be used as a tool of oppression111 and for 
perpetuating repugnant norms and practices. They further argue that rights 
universalism ensures that all human beings are entitled to equal rights.112  
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A full discussion on the “universalism and cultural relativism” debate 
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it does shows the challenges 
that could arise if an African Lex Petrolea is shaped primarily on 
indigenous African social ordering norms. It raises the important concern 
on whether an African Lex Petrolea primarily based on indigenous social 
ordering norms can result in cultural and ethnic relativism respectively. 
Ethnic relativism, in particular, is a matter of concern as it focuses on the 
superiority of one ethnic group over another and delegitimises national 
hegemony and identity.113 
The example of the Niger Delta which is a current theatre of oil and 
gas resource conflicts demonstrates the dangers of a petroleum 
governance framework that perpetuates ethnic relativism and not national 
hegemony and identity. As previously stated, there is the continuing belief 
that wealth extracted from minerals within this region is being utilised by 
other ethnic groups within Nigeria to the detriment of the developmental 
needs of the groups within the Niger Delta.114 While it is important to 
promote true federalism which allows the component units to exert greater 
control over the natural resources situated within their regions, this should 
not detract from the fundamental objective of the common national good.  
It is debatable whether the underlining normative rule of Ubuntu and 
its different variants will perpetuate ethnic relativism. This is because the 
concept itself canvasses for interdependence and common humanity 
where all is done for the common good of all. Unfortunately, many 
African states which are obligated by their Constitutions and national laws 
to manage natural resources in trust for the common benefit of their 
citizens have failed to do so. This is why there is a need for the 
restructuring of the framework of petroleum governance which is 
currently premised on domanial state ownership. The inclusion of an 
underlining African social ordering norm which facilitates ‘a bottom to 
top’ approach which encourages local communities to participate in the 
decision-making process may help to de-escalate current volatilities 
within theatres of resource conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
PART FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is a key region for oil and gas exploitation. Yet 
some of its key petroleum basins are regarded as theatres of resource 
conflicts. These conflicts are partly due to dialectical conflicts between 
the “civic public” and the “primordial public”. This article argues that 
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these conflicts can be de-escalated through the development of an African 
Lex Petrolea comprising of received Western law and practices and 
indigenous African social ordering norms. The current effort of the APPA 
states to develop standardised rules for the continent is a step in the right 
direction in ensuring effective governance of petroleum resources. The 
APPA study however has some shortcomings. This is because the study 
primarily caters to the needs of oil companies and African civic states. Yet 
as Ekeh’s “Two Publics”115 demonstrates, many African communities 
operate within “Two Publics”- the “civic public” consisting of the state 
apparatus and institutions, and the “primordial public’ consisting of the 
family, community and ethnic groupings. The article recommends for the 
development of an inclusive framework work of petroleum governance 
that is not only premised on domanial state ownership alone, but one that 
embodies the underlining African social ordering norm of social justice, 
fairness and inter-dependence. This norm is known by many names, the 
most popular description of the norm is the term ‘Ubuntu.’ 
This article however questions whether this norm has attained the 
status of grundnorm as argued in other literature.116. This is because the 
“civic public” represented through the state structure controls the 
legitimisation process of legal normative formation. The presupposition 
exercise for normative formation is premised on state sovereignty. This 
has led to the establishment of a hierarchical system of legal governance 
where the State Constitution is regarded as the supreme law of the land 
and embodying the grundnorm or fundamental rule.  
The 1993 transitional Constitution of South Africa was presented as a 
bold attempt of an African state to incorporate the underlining basic 
African social ordering norm known as Ubuntu. Unfortunately this was 
not followed through in the final 1996 Constitution. This demonstrates the 
continuing application of the modernisation theory which requires Africa 
to continue to treat Western received law as its benchmark for 
development and modernisation, without equal regard to African social 
ordering norms. This article recommends further empirical study be 
undertaken by the APPA or similar bodies to ascertain the continent-wide 
application of these norms and their relevance to the development of an 
inclusive framework of petroleum governance for all stakeholders in 
Africa. 
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